Is Belarus on its way to become a democracy?

14 min readAug 25, 2020

The escalation of the political situation in Belarus began after the election day on the 9th of August. The concerns about the credibility of the vote count were far from surprising since it has not been the first rigged election throughout 26 years of Lukashenko’s reign. Something, however, has changed in the minds of Belarusians. Somewhat rarely, they started to believe that they can become a catalyst for change. Despite the opposition leader fleeing to Lithuania, more and more Belarusians came to express their disapproval with the current system, and as of 24/08/2020, the numbers exceeded two hundred thousand protestors. Is 2020 the year when we will see the fall of the “last dictatorship” in Europe?

The fall of the “last dictatorship” in Europe?

Firstly, we should briefly look at where has this nickname for Belarus come from. The Council of Europe (CoE) is an international institution, whose aim is to “uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law of Europe”. [1]

Clearly, Belarus is the only country in Europe that has not yet joined the CoE, and so it is the last dictatorship. Right?

Well, no. Whilst the intentions of those establishing the CoE were genuine, in practice, it is an organisation lacking common values as well as priorities. The CoE membership of countries such as Russia or Azerbaijan, which are scoring low on the Democracy Index and Freedomhouse, seems rather ironic, given the mission statement of CoE. Some countries have made progress towards becoming democratic, but perhaps surprisingly, countries who did are actually not even EU members (Ukraine, Armenia).

EU countries in recent years experienced a substantial rise of political parties and leaders, who act less and less in line with democratic principles (eg. Hungary, Poland). It is naive to see Europe as some robust island of a functioning democracy. Democracy is very fragile by its nature, but it should be in our interest to help spread it, as it is possibly the greatest human invention of all time, considering the successes we achieved in the democratic world (speaking of GDP per capita, average life expectancies, or HDI).

Frustration with the “politics of eternity”

“Politics of eternity” is a concept created by an American historian Timothy Snyder, who uses it to describe it as the ideology most notably adopted by Putin during his second premiership (2008–2012), as well as by many other populists over the world, later on in the decade, i.e Trump or Le Pen. The politics of eternity “places one nation at the centre of a cyclical story of victimhood“ with the victimhood being always rooted externally (the spoiled West, the EU, liberalism, homosexuals).[2] The ultimate goal is not to solve domestic problems, but to make people believe there is no other alternative, as other countries are doing just as bad, if not worse, and that is not going to change at any point in time in the future.

The easiest way to persuade the population about the “politics of eternity” is through the spread of conspiracies and hoaxes, ideally by government-controlled media. Especially during the start of the military conflict in Ukraine, Russian propaganda has been very effective in doing so. Not only did it make Russians believe that they are on the “good side”, but it also confused many Westerners, leaving Ukraine neither with the support of the general public in the EU nor from key geopolitical players.

How does this relate to Belarus? As a dictator, Lukashenko has been always trying to balance relations with both West and East, whilst restricting the freedom of speech and helping to spread fabricated news, all for his own purposes. Out of 180 countries, Belarus ranked 153rd in the World Press Freedom Index 2020.[3]

The Wolrd Press Freedom Index Ranking 2020

“There is a build-up of military power on the western borders of the country. Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine are ordering us to hold new elections. If we listen to them, we will perish” Lukashenko said in reaction to protests when asked about the possibility of a new election. Unsurprisingly, there is no real evidence proving NATO buildup in the region.[4]

The president of Belarus — Alexandr Lukashenko

As internal problems (protests) after the rigged elections emerged, Lukashenko used the textbook “politics of eternity” approach: blame the West and NGOs for financing these protests. The people on those protests? They are not Belarusians. They are “foreign-backed revolutionaries … who want to destabilise the country,” said Lukashenko. [5] The very same illogical chain of reasoning was present in the Ukrainian Euromaidan protests in 2014.

The importance of “politics of eternity” in the world has risen over the past decade, and it did spread into the White House too, as certain media started to blame the internal US problems on Mexicans, Chinese, Muslims, liberals, etc. It is striking that the most notable refusal of “politics of eternity” came from Belarus after 26 years of authoritative rule. The frustration escalated not entirely as a result of the election rigging. The elections were claimed to be fraudulent in the past too.

Yet, in 2020, there was also the evident mismanagement of mitigating the spread of Covid-19, with Lukashenko refusing to acknowledge even its existence. The public became so frustrated that people are now willing to risk their lives for the hope of a better future. Belarusians have decided that freedom and democracy are worth fighting for because it can bring real progress to people’s lives. Inspiring and admirable as that is, Belarus is in a precarious situation, which will make it immensely difficult for Belarus to gain what it strives for.

Ukraine and Belarus — Rigged elections and protests

Ukraine and Belarus are both post-communist presidential republics, which stayed politically loyal to Russia after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. They both signed a treaty that established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — an international organisation of originally 10 post-communist countries that encourages economic and political cooperation. CIS includes subdivisions of the Eurasian Economic and Customs Union, which allow citizens of member states free movement of goods and services, just as the EU Customs Union does.

However, before joining these two Unions mentioned above, Ukraine found itself at the crossroad between the West and the East. Before the 2004 presidential elections, it was a battle between two Viktors: Pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych vs Pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. Resembling the current situation in Belarus, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) claimed that the vote did not meet international standards after Yanukovych was declared the winner by Ukraine’s electoral commission.[6]

The main Ukrainian presidential candidates in 2004 — Viktor Yanukovych (left) and Viktor Yushchenko (right)

This led to the “Orange Revolution”, a serious of protests named after the campaign colour of Yushchenko, as hundreds of thousands of people went to demonstrate against the evident election fraud. Consequently, there was a re-run of the election, where Yushchenko won with 52% against Yanukovych’s 44%. However, Yushchenko’s presidency was accompanied by permanent political turmoil. He dismissed the parliament twice and his coalition with a contemporary Prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko (also one of the leading figures in the Orange revolution) collapsed. Ukraine was not able to revert its geopolitical direction due to the incapability of political leaders to reach a consensus, and the frustrated public voted for Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential elections.[7]

The distribution of votes in presidential elections 2004

Although Yanukovych’s electorate was based in the Russian-speaking South-East, in the campaign he focused on former pro-European voters of Yushchenko from West as well, by promising in to build strategic relations with the EU, specifically by signing Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement. Under pressure from Putin, who feared losing influence over another post-soviet country, he offered $15bn financial help to Ukraine (10% of Ukrainian GDP at the time), intending to discourage the ratification of the Association Agreement.

To the disbelief of predominantly Western Ukrainians, Yanukovych folded under pressure and offered Ukrainians closer ties with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. This triggered another series of protests called “Euromaidan”, which lasted from November 2013 to February 2014, and where once again hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to demand the European future for Ukraine.

Ukraine eventually got rid of Yanukovych, who was replaced by Petro Poroshenko, but it was at the cost of losing Crimea and suffering a frozen conflict in Donbas, as Putin exploited the instability of Ukraine at the time. In spite of that, Ukraine finally signed the European Association agreement in 2018. Since 2014, Ukraine improved its score in the Democracy Index from 5.4 to 5.9, bringing it on the edge between so-called “flawed democracy” and a “hybrid regime”. In terms of fairness in the Electoral Process, Ukraine gained 4/4 by FreedomHouse in 2020. [8] [9]

The Ukrainian story epitomises the great difficulty that a post-soviet country in the Russian sphere of influence needs to overcome to become democratic. It took 16 years, two massive protests, and hundreds of lives for Ukraine to become democratic, and it still is not quite there. Belarus has only started its run towards democracy, but this run is a marathon rather than a sprint.

Why is it more difficult for Belarus than it was for Ukraine?

Belarus’s run towards democracy is yet ought to be even more difficult than it was for Ukraine. There are 3 main factors: economic, historical, and geopolitical.

Economic

Tourism in Belarus is Russia-dependent, as Russians account for 82% of tourists in Belarus, which is incomparably more than 42% in Ukraine. The number in Belarus can yet be even higher in reality, due to the free movement of people between Belarus and Russia. When the relations between Ukraine and Russia became hostile in 2014, the total number of tourists in 2014 plummeted by half. Therefore, any similar hostility that could arise from Belarus cutting its ties with Russia could be devastating for the sector of the Belarusian economy that is dependent on tourism.[10]

More importantly, the trade dependency on Russia overall is enormous, and it is deeper in Belarus than it was in Ukraine before the Euromaidan. In terms of injections into the circular flow of income, 38% of Belarusian exports went to Russia, in comparison with 23% of Ukraine in 2013. Whilst Ukraine imported 30% of goods from Russia in 2013, Belarus imported about 58% last year, demonstrating a massive dependence on the supply of energy (gas, oil). According to some estimates, due to price cuts on oil offered by Russia, Belarus is able to re-export Russian oil, which has on average accounted for 15% of Belarusian GDP annually.[11] [12]

Energetic dependence is especially tricky, since these are non-renewable energy sources, and unlike with regular goods such as electronics, only countries with oil/gas deposits can trade them. Belarus would have to ensure its energetic needs from the scratch, but crucially, if combined with the abolishment of price cuts by Russia, Belarusians would inevitably also experience an increase in living costs, as the utility bills would rise, resulting in a lower disposable income especially for the poorest section of the population.

The implications would also affect businesses, as the consumption would fall for goods with elastic demand, and the government would consequently lack the tax revenue from the VAT. Russia is well aware of its natural advantage, and as such, it is going to use it as leverage against Belarus, had it decided to cut ties with Russia.

Historical

A transformation to democracy from an authoritarian system is difficult in any case, but without any experience with democracy whatsoever, Belarusians are facing even a bigger challenge than Ukrainians, who had already fought for democracy in 2004 before finally making gradual improvements after Euromaidan in 2014.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at its greatest extent (source: https://alchetron.com/Polish%E2%80%93Lithuanian-Commonwealth)

Up until the 19th century, Belarus used to be a part of the Lithuanian Duchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which were both monarchies. Since the 19th century, Belarus was a part of a bigger Russian state. Firstly as a part of the Russian empire, and later as a part of the USSR. The very first democratic elections that took place in Belarus were the ones in 1994 when Lukashenko won. Belarus did not have another leader ever since. Unfortunately, Belarus has no democratic legacy to refer to in their protests or in their visions for a better future.

As abstract as legacy may seem, psychologically it makes a big difference because people are willing to sacrifice more if they believe that the result is certain. The certainty thus results from looking back at something that has worked well in the past. Alternatively, a future with a system that has not ever been experienced in a particular society creates uncertainty.

Unlike Belarus, Czechoslovakia had experience with democracy during the interwar period. For Czechs and Slovaks, it was clear that during that period they were living in a more prosperous and country with more freedom than after WWII, and that is why they were willing to sacrifice anything to get the freedom back. Moreover, Czechoslovakia just as many other countries of the former Eastern Bloc had momentum created by Gorbachev, who claimed that no country should be forced to be communist. Although it still had not been clear how serious the claim was, or if a reaction similar to the 1968 invasion could occur, the momentum was there and countries of the “Warsaw Pact” started their run towards democracy together, whereas Belarus today is alone.

The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia 1989

Geopolitical

Belarus was one of the 10 countries that initially joined the CIS in 1991, but unlike Ukraine, Belarus also joined the subdivisions of the Eurasian Economic and Customs Union. Belarus also joined the Union State of Russia and Belarus, which is the deepest form of Russian integration. For example, the Union State includes an equivalent of NATO’s Article 5: “An attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all NATO members”.

Although Belarus has gained membership in the EU-originated Eastern Partnership in 2009, there are no indications that the Association Agreement with the EU will be on the table anytime soon. The EU enlargement of 2004, 2007, and 2013 had unintended consequences, as the process of European integration has slowed down and the EU itself went through several crises (Great Recession 2008, Eurozone Debt Crisis, Migrant Crisis).

Therefore, the EU was recently focused on itself rather than on enlarging even further. If it took the EU five years since the Euromaidan to ratify the Association Agreement with Ukraine, how long could it possibly be with Belarus?

Nonetheless, the main urgent concern for Belarus and for those on the streets is a potential intervention of the Russian military to suppress protestors. Lukashenko has allegedly called Putin twice to ask for help to handle the public unrest, and Putin reassured him he is willing and able to help. The prospect of that happening is horrifying since someone as ruthless as Putin is able to use brutal force to ensure and maintain political influence over Belarus.

Nowadays, it is not the easiest time for Belarus to find any globally significant democratic ally that would be able to level the Russian military. At the end of Trump’s presidency, it is inarguable that the last four years of the American geopolitics have been different from the previous 75 years when the US acted as the Global Policeman. Trump has adopted the same approach as the US during WWII -“isolationism”.

Caricature of Trump’s politics of isolationism

Before the US got involved in WWII, it deemed Europe as too chaotic and unstable, and after the Great Depression in the 1930s they decided to take a step back from military conflicts that do not directly affect the US and to focus on internal issues. Trump has similarly focused on domestic policies, such as employment, leaving the spot for the “Global Policeman” vacant.

Hypothetically, the EU could have claimed that it is willing to protect a potential democracy, in the same way as the US protected Taiwan from Communist China in 1949, but it would have to have an army in order to make Russia seriously consider military intervention. Sanctions imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea had a negative effect on the Russian economy, but they were not significant enough to deter Putin from breaking the international law, as well as the Budapest Memorandum, where Ukraine gave up on all their nuclear weapons in an exchange for a guarantee that Ukrainian borders will be protected.

The concept of a common military in the EU is not new. Out of all the current EU leaders, Emmanuel Macron has been the most vocal. He mentioned establishing the EU Army in his campaign in 2017, but despite his election success, no progress has been made since. Macron failed to bring the issue to a public discourse across the EU. Admirably, despite the slow economic growth, France was recently reaching the NATO requirement of a 2% budget contribution on defense. On the other hand Germany, after years of strong growth, unfair current account surplus, and a sustained budget surplus, kept its contribution to 1.5%. It is a perfect demonstration of the prevailing reluctance of the EU countries to spend money on the military.

Hungary and Poland are also having issues with the concept itself, but rather than having a problem with financing the military, they deem it a threat to their national sovereignty. Ignoring the fact that the EU Army would predominantly be an instrument of protecting themselves, their reasoning is still pathetic at best because it refuses to look at the current geopolitical situation in a global context. The US has been isolating for the last four years, and the EU was not able to react. It could have gotten more integrated and be a successor of the US as the new protector of democracy. Instead, it was too self-observed and slow to respond to the changes in the world, which was immediately exploited by Russia, and a new emerging superpower — China. [13]

Clearly, the current geopolitical situation is far from ideal for Belarus. With no support from the US, and with the EU that is neither able to properly defend itself, nor to protect Belarus, there is no way Belarusians can protect themselves from Russian military intervention. I deem this as the most urgent threat to Belarus and its future.

Marathon

Belarus found itself in the middle of a potential revolution due to the incompetence, corruption, and unfairness of their current system. They know that they can do better and they would do better if they could live in a democracy. Metaphorically, I compared the transformation into a democracy to a run, specifically, to a marathon. This may become one of the most difficult marathons in human history. The worst scenario of an intervention by the Russian military is currently the most likely one. However, even if Belarusians overthrow Lukashenko successfully, they will be just done with the first kilometer, and there are 41 more to go. Let’s hope that Belarusians have enough stamina to surprise the world.